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ABSTRACT**: Why do charitable nonprofit, service-providing
organizations save? What are the tradeoffs between using income
to build up cash reserves and serving more clients? Saving may
generate income, protect the organization against a drop in dona-
tions, and increase the organization’s chances of survival. Saving,
though, may affect the likelihood that nonprofits receive private and
public funding. We model the relationship among private and public
income, economic conditions, and nonprofit savings. We find that
anticipation of government help during difficult times tends to
reduce the amount of saving done by the nonprofit. This effect is
strengthened if government officials view unspent donations as indi-
cative of a lack of need. Both these effects provide a strong incentive
for nonprofits to spend on current consumption rather than to save
for the future, and thus to increase the burden on the public purse.
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Introduction
In many societies services are provided to needy individuals
through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. In addition to
government agencies, an entire array of nonprofit organizations exists
to provide services to those with perceived needs. The clientele are
diverse, including children and youth at risk, the elderly, the hungry
and homeless, and victims of illness, addiction, child abuse, and vio-
lence. Many of the nonprofits providing such services are locally or
regionally operated and depend on funding from a variety of public,
nonprofit, and private sources to serve their clients. Such nonprofits
typically survive on very short-term budgets, estimating income
frequently and expending as needed to meet the needs of as many
clients as possible given short-run income. These nonprofits typically
focus on the immediate needs of their clients and spend little time on
long-term planning, which would involve balancing revenues and
expenditures with a focus on stabilizing or growing the organization.1
This environment creates a strong incentive for nonprofit managers
to save little or nothing.
The purpose of this research is to examine the financial deci-
sions of nonprofit organizations in terms of the tradeoff between
using income to build up cash reserves and serving more clients.
From the standpoint of most nonprofit service providers, demand
for services exceeds the organization’s ability to respond. Spending
nearly all income to serve clients, rather than saving, may better suit
the mission of the nonprofit organization. As Bowman (1999) notes,
though, [saving] may be used to generate income for current opera-
tions, store wealth to protect the organization in the event that its
popularity with future donors wanes, and increase the organization’s
chances of survival. We question whether saving decreases the like-
lihood of receiving larger government grants in the future. If funders
see unspent funds as indicative of a lack of need, nonprofit managers
have strong incentives to expend available funds to meet current
demand and to perhaps increase grants received in the future. In
other words, managers may rationally reduce savings in an attempt
1 Although not supported by peer-reviewed research, the authors have
observed in conversation with board members and other researchers, in the
media, and in their roles on nonprofit boards, that these organizations are
somewhat myopic. They tend to balance several months’ worth of operating
reserves (for safety or solvency) against the possibility that funders will see
them as having excess funds.
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to ensure the future viability of donor funds. Similarly, if the potential
exists for a government grantor to provide emergency funding to a
nonprofit in times of duress, the nonprofit has an incentive to reduce
savings.
We investigate whether these financial and institutional
incentives create an environment where nonprofit managers ration-
ally expend a significant portion (if not all) of current income
and savings and rely on the expectation of government funds in
times of duress to secure future funding. We argue that what
may appear to be ‘excessive’ current spending by nonprofits can be
viewed as a means of expanding the current (and future) client
base and strengthening the nonprofit’s ability to secure future
grants.2 In the following sections, we first review the literature
and then develop a theoretical model of nonprofit savings that
illustrates how incentives can shape the decisions of nonprofit
managers.
1 Literature
While much work has been done on the relationship between
saving and implicit tax subsidies, explicit grants and subsidies,
production effects, portfolio choices, and ‘spillover’ effects and finan-
cial stability issues from for-profit to nonprofit conversion (or vice
versa),3 the behavior of nonprofit managers with regard to saving has
received scant attention in the literature. Despite the fact that wealth-
accumulating or savings decisions must predate portfolio choices and
have consequences in terms of production, funding, taxes, and the
ability to serve clients’ needs in the future, how, and more import-
antly, why, nonprofit managers make investment and expenditure
decisions remain unanswered questions.
The very existence and persistence of many nonprofits have
been posited on the public subsidies available to the sector. James
(1983) noted that nonprofits often abound in those areas where
2 While many of the ideas in this paper could apply equally well to
funding provided by private foundations or other nonprofits, we concentrate
on public funding. We are particularly interested in social-service providing
nonprofits, which tend to receive a large percentage of their funding from
government agencies.
3 See, for example, Solberg (1991), Kingma (1993), and Edie and Smith
(1994).
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government has accepted some responsibility in financing production
but has delegated the responsibility of production to other organiza-
tions.4
With the exception of regulatory constraints to ensure non-
profit fiduciary integrity, governments often take a hands-off
approach in the actual production and distribution of the goods
and services. Government officials, however, may be highly invested
and interested in nonprofit output that complements or substi-
tutes the production of public goods and services. For this
reason and for accountability purposes connected with the use of
public money, the financial decisions which could ultimately
make or break the nonprofit are of interest to government (Salamon
1987).
Governments may subsidize nonprofits implicitly and explicitly
(James 1983; Rose-Ackerman, 1986). First, private organizations may
be better positioned to charge fees for services, reducing total produc-
tion costs paid by the government. This may be especially true for the
provision of quasi-public goods where certain private benefits can be
captured by fees.5 Second, nonprofits relying on volunteer labor or
those offering wages below public sector wages may reduce produc-
tion costs. Third, if it is optimal to offer services based on religion
or language, which presents a problem to many governments that
are restricted or unable to offer such differentiated services, this
constraint can be circumvented by delegating production to nonpro-
fits. Finally, nonprofits may be more trustworthy in the eyes of the
public and to public officials who provide funds, than their for-profit
counterparts (Hansmann 1980).
While the literature suggests that the public sector may influ-
ence the behavior of nonprofit managers, it does not examine the
direct import of government involvement on nonprofit saving. Several
authors have noted effects on financial stability from conversion from
nonprofit to for-profit status or vice versa (Robinson 1997, Claxton
et al. 1997), and from implicit tax subsidies, and explicit grants and
subsidies, to nonprofits in Canada and elsewhere (Salamon and
4 In Canada, for example, despite cutbacks of government funding to the
nonprofit sector, government remains a major contributor to nonprofits. More
than 50 per cent of the funding of all registered charitable organizations
comes from government, and hospitals and universities receive nearly 70
per cent of their funding from government (Sharpe 1994).
5 Examples include the provision of education, child care, and long term
health care.
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Abramson 1992; Hall and Macpherson 1997).6 Others have examined
the relationship between government funds and private donations.
Brooks (2000) surveys and interprets the empirical work examining
the relationship between government social spending and private
donations. He finds that, overall, government funding cannot be
shown to crowd out private donations. In the area of social service
provision, he finds that government funding does crowd out private
giving (see also Payne 1991). Others have found no significant
relationship between revenue sources (Khanna et al. 1995; Okten
and Weisbrod 2000). Khanna and Sandler (2000) and Knight (2002)
suggest that government grants may crowd-in, or leverage, private
donations. Like the ‘flypaper effect’ (Rosen 1995, p. 543) of national
grants attracting more money in local and state governments, their
studies imply that money sticks in the sector where it originally hits.
None of these, however, looks at the effect of nonprofit savings on
revenue generation.
Several studies are of particular interest for this research.
Tuckman and Chang (1992) derive a behavioral model of nonprofit
equity and apply it to a national sample of charitable nonprofits in the
United States. While this study examines the savings decisions by
nonprofits, it fails to address the issue of nonprofits receiving public
funds and the implications of public funds on savings. Bloche (1998)
considers whether the public sector intervenes to support nonprofits
that encounter financial problems. He notes that government inter-
vention is more likely to occur when nonprofits provide goods and
services that are partial substitutes for government services. Bloche,
however, does not explicitly model the public sector funding aspect.
Our contribution to the literature is a theoretical model of nonprofit
savings, examining how they respond to the issue of public funding
and the incentives given to nonprofit managers to expend or save.
In the following section we present our theoretical model of
nonprofit savings. Assuming altruistic, or perhaps particularistic
incentives,7 we note the existence of an optimal level of nonprofit
savings from the perspective of the nonprofit.8 We model constraints
6 There is evidence of government funding of nonprofits (‘charities’ in
the Canadian context) in some form or another in most categories with the
single exception of religion in Canada and the USA.
7 The objective function could be called particularistic, assuming that the
nonprofit manager cares only about maximum welfare of the nonprofit’s
clients.
8 Note that the objective function of the nonprofit need not be coincident
with the social objective function.
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on surplus accumulation required by government and other grant
makers and the necessity of protecting the organization from closing
its doors. We then discuss how empirically to examine the savings
decision, and note data needed to test the ideas generated by the
theoretical model.
2 Theoretical savings behavior
In order to examine nonprofit savings behavior, we must first
specify what motivates nonprofit managers. Although economics sug-
gests that nonprofit agents maximize something, there is no clear
consensus of what it is that nonprofits maximize, especially within a
multi-period context (Young 1983). We address this problem by exam-
ining the actions of a nonprofit (or a group of agents making the
decisions for the nonprofit’s operations) that has the same goals as a
typical client. We assume that nonprofit managers are altruistic, or
particularistic,9 and thus no principal-agency problems occur between
the nonprofit and its clients.10 Manager’s utility is represented by
client utility, thus we ask what is it that nonprofits should do if they
faithfully represent the interests of their actual and potential clients?
The contribution of this research is mainly positive. If the altruism
assumption is (sufficiently) valid our model describes the behavior of
the nonprofit organization. If the utility function of the nonprofit
organization is subject to agency issues or is different from the utility
function we postulate, then our contribution may be viewed as a
possible normative guide for an altruistic organization.
We focus on a nonprofit with income from individual donations
from several private sector donors and a single government donor.11
The nonprofit’s income is uncertain and depends on the state of the
economy. Nonprofit management therefore allocates resources across
9 Whether the manager is altruistic or particularistic will not affect the
set up of our model. In either case, we assume no principal-agency problems
occur between management and clients.
10 Since much of the literature on nonprofits emphasizes that the very
emergence of nonprofits may be based on their ability to resolve agency
problems, assumptions of an altruistic nonprofit may be a reasonable
approximation to reality. The seminal article on this issue is Hansmann
(1980).
11 With minor modifications, the results could apply to nonprofits
receiving grants from foundations or other private grantmakers.
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time under conditions of uncertainty. We focus on a single measure of
consumption per client (Ct) to capture the uncertainty on levels of
service provision.12
While managers can calculate current consumption, C1, (period
one private income less any period one saving divided by the number
of period one recipients), future consumption is uncertain. Individuals
who are needy in one period may not be needy in a future period. We
thus assume that the nonprofit makes its saving decision by maximiz-
ing the utility of a typical current client plus the expected utility of a
future client, and that client utility is a function of consumption of the
nonprofit’s services.
What factors must be considered in the nonprofit’s decision of
whether (and how much) to save? If the probability of government
intervention is negatively affected by an increase in savings of the
nonprofit, one might expect to see little or no saving.13 As Austen-
Smith and Jenkins note (1985, p. 124), it seems reasonable that grants
fall away when the nonprofit makes a net surplus. Savings proxy the
extent of resources available to the nonprofit, and the existence of
savings may be interpreted by the government donor as a lack of need
for additional resources to meet mission objectives.14 Grants may also
have a positive opportunity cost and donors are unlikely to provide
funds in excess of what is necessary to maintain nonprofit operations.15
In terms of our model, the nonprofit balances the need for
government grants with the need for some operating reserves in the
form of saving, thus incorporating the constraints on current spend-
ing into its decision making process. Specifically, the amount of saving
done by a nonprofit may be affected by the probability of government
help, and the probability that government helps may be affected by
12 For technical reasons we assume that the identity and number of
clients is exogenously fixed.
13 The public sector may be prejudiced against surpluses accumulated by
nonprofits is illustrated by a news item in the Toronto Star, June 10, 1994.
This reports that the appropriate legislative committee took a negative view of
an audit indicating that a nonprofit built up a sizeable surplus.
14 Savings do not always signal need. Depending on the organization in
question, savings may signal quality or credibility of the organization.
Universities, for example, may signal their quality by size of their
endowments.
15 We must qualify this statement if there is capital investment. In the
last section of the paper, we discuss data on nonprofit finances which contain
information about whether the agency saves above and beyond what is needed
for day-to-day operations.
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the amount of saving. We show under certain conditions that the
possibility of future government help can pressure nonprofits to
spend all current income, which then puts pressure on government
grantors to continue to finance nonprofits.
3 The theoretical model
Consider a nonprofit facing a two period time horizon. In period
one, nonprofit managers determine what level of services to provide,
knowing that they face uncertain conditions in the second period. We
assume there are no savings at the beginning of period one. Nonprofit
managers choose between saving, s, and not saving in the first period,
with savings being carried into the second period (thus s needs no
time subscript as it is accumulated in period one and spent in period
two). Income from private sources, yi, is known at the time of the
saving decision, where i is high or low (yH, yL), depending on economic
conditions (yH> yL). The manager calculates client consumption in
period one to be C1¼ yi s.
Period two uncertainty is captured by defining ‘good’ times
occurring with probability pH, and ‘bad’ times occurring with prob-
ability pL¼ 1 pH. ‘Bad’ times may be further categorized by whether
or not government grantors provide funding to the nonprofit. The
probability of government help is . Thus the probabilities for future
conditions in period two are pH, pL (1 ), and pL, reflecting the
probability of high private income, low private income with no gov-
ernment assistance, and low private income with government help.
If government grantors provide funding to the nonprofit, we
assume they insure a minimum consumption level per client, z
(yH< z< yL). Government grantors view the intervention as an emer-
gency measure reflecting client needs. We assume that if government
grantors provide support, they do not permit saving any of this support
for the future. Further, government grantors require the nonprofit to
exhaust its private income, including savings, to meet client needs. The
amount of government funding per client is g, where g¼ z s yL.
We assume government intervention is non-punitive, g 0.16
We also assume that the probability of government intervention, ,
16 This seems a reasonable assumption as the nonprofit may be expected
to first exhaust its own resources. It is not, however, a necessary assumption
and is made for convenience only. Relaxing it does not affect our results.
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is a non-increasing function of s, and that s 0.17 Thus, 0(s) 0,
reflecting that government officials may be less willing to provide
help to a nonprofit that has accumulated savings and appears to be
less needy. Since saving may signal a surplus, and given the asymme-
try of information, the government donor cannot distinguish between
savings generated by a lack of need and savings generated for future
bad times. We ignore savings that take the form of capital stock as
these are not always easily observed.
In each period, the utility of an individual receiving services
from the nonprofit is U(), where U0> 0 and U00< 0. We assume that
the nonprofit is a Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility maximizer
whose utility is U. The assumption of risk aversion, U00< 0, is the
motivation for consumption smoothing on which our model is based.
We ignore the value of time; a simplifying assumption that does not
affect our results. The nonprofit then chooses s to maximize V:
V ¼ U y1  sð Þ þ pHU yH2 þ sð Þ þ pL 1  ð ÞU yL2 þ sð Þ þ pLU zð Þ ð1Þ
Assuming that the nonprofit cannot engage in negative saving in the
first period so that s 0,18 the optimizing conditions are @V/@s 0,
s 0 and s @V/@s¼ 0. Two possibilities arise: s¼ 0 or s> 0. If s> 0, we
have an interior solution and the first order condition for a maximum
is @V/@s¼ 0. If s¼ 0, we have a corner solution such that @V/@s< 0.
The nonprofit does not save. Note that given the concavity of V,
@V/@s> 0 at s¼ 0 implies that the charity does some saving. Whether
or not the charity saves therefore depends on the sign of @V/@s. If this
is non-positive, no saving is done by the nonprofit; if it is strictly
positive, the nonprofit does save.
We now proceed to examine what induces savings by the non-
profit, the case where s> 0 and @V/@s¼ 0. Dropping the second period
time subscripts on y (showing only yH and yL), the first order condition
for a maximum is:
17 Once again it should be noted that ‘s’ represents liquid savings that can
be easily converted to future consumption. The government donor is less
likely to penalize the nonprofit if investment is made in capital stock
befitting its mission.
18 In this two-period model the nonprofit is assumed to start out with no
savings. This implies that its first period saving cannot be negative. In a
multi-period model a nonprofit may save and dis-save. Extending the model
in this way, however, does not alter our main findings.




¼  U0 y1  s	ð Þ þ pHU0 yH þ s	ð Þ þ pL 1  ð ÞU0 yL þ s	ð Þ
 pL0U yL þ s	ð Þ þ 0pLU zð Þ ¼ 0 ð2Þ
We consider two scenarios: (i) 0 ¼ 0 and (ii) 0< 0 which characterize
government intervention as independent or dependent of the savings
done by the nonprofit.
(i) Characterizing the saving decision when 0 ¼ 0
We begin with the case where the probability of government
intervention does not depend on how much savings the nonprofit
does, or 0 ¼ 0. Replacing pH by 1 pL, and assuming @V/@s 0,
evaluated at s¼ 0, we rewrite equation (2), the ‘no-saving’ condition
as:
U0ðy1Þ  1  pLð ÞU0ðyHÞ þ pLð1  ÞU0ðyLÞ ð3Þ
We can decompose the expected marginal utility of consumption
(right-hand side) as follows:
(a) (1 pL) U0(yH) is the component relating to the income from
private sources being high. Since yH y1, U0(y1)U0(yH). If
pL, is small so that (1 pL) U0(yH) is the dominant term in
the equation (3), no savings takes place.
(b) pL (1 ) U0(yL) is the component related to the income from
private sources being low with no help provided by the govern-
ment. If the probability of this, pL, (1 ), is sufficiently small,
either because yL is unlikely or government help is very likely,
then the nonprofit will not save.
Intuitively (given decreasing marginal utility), when the marginal
utility of current consumption is greater than the expected marginal
utility of future consumption, the nonprofit will not save.
The probability of government help is crucial here as can be
seen by rewriting (3) as:
  U
0ðyHÞ  U0ðC1Þ½  þ pL U0ðyLÞ  U0ðyHÞ½ 
pLU0ðyLÞ ð4Þ
where pL 6¼ 0. Suppose that a bad year occurs in period one, or C1¼ yL.
Equation (4) is then:
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  ð1  pLÞ U
0ðyHÞ  U0ðyLÞ½ 
pLU0ðyLÞ ð5Þ
The right-hand side of this equation is negative, and 0  0, implying
that in bad times, no saving takes place regardless of the likelihood of
good times in the second period and the government’s propensity to
intervene.
Even if the nonprofit has a good year in period one (C1¼ yH), the
nonprofit might not save if the probability of government interven-
tion is sufficiently large. From (4), the condition for saving to take
place is:
1    U
0ðyHÞ
U0ðyLÞ ð6Þ
If the probability that the government will not help, (1 ) is larger
than the ratio of the marginal utility of yH (consumption in good
times) to the marginal utility of yL (consumption in bad times) the
nonprofit will save. In utility terms, then, the reduction of current
consumption by one dollar costs the marginal utility of consumption
in good times U0(yH). This yields a benefit only if the government does
not provide support, for if the government does intervene, the non-
profit’s clients consume z in the second period regardless of the
amount saved. From the nonprofit’s perspective the saving is wasted
if the government intervenes. At the margin, in good times we com-
pare the loss in utility in the first period, U0(yH), with the expected
gain in utility in the second period, (1 )U0(yL). Note, however, that
if yL is considered by the nonprofit to be below a minimal consump-
tion level so that U0(yL) is very large, the nonprofit will tend to save
unless government help is almost certain.
(ii) Characterizing the saving decision when 0< 0
Now suppose that government grant makers are sensitive to the
amount of savings a nonprofit has accumulated, and specifically 0< 0.
This introduces a term which takes into account the negative relation-
ship between savings and the likelihood of government support, which
tends to decrease the expected value of the utility of savings.
The relevant marginal decrease in the probability of govern-
ment support is 0 pL. The net utility value of government support,
U(z)U(yL), is multiplied by 0 pL to reflect the expected future utility
of consumption in bad times with government support to a consump-
tion level of z.
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If the effect of saving on  is large at s¼ 0, the likelihood that
the nonprofit will save is small: When 0< 0 is incorporated, again
assuming @V/@s 0 evaluated at s¼ 0, the ‘no-saving’ condition from
equation (2) may be written as:
  U
0ðyHÞ  U0ðC1Þ½  þ pL U0ðyLÞ  U0ðyHÞ½ 
pLU0ðyLÞ þ
pL
0 UðzÞ  UðyLÞ½ 
pLU0ðyLÞ ð7Þ
This is the same as equation (4) except that the second term on
the right-hand side is negative, implying that the condition for no
saving is less stringent than the case when 0 ¼ 0. If the first period is




0 UðzÞ  UðyLÞð Þ
U0ðyLÞ ð8Þ
Even if the first term in (8) is small, no saving takes place if
the second term is large. Saving, by reducing the probability of
government intervention, increases the probability that the client
of the nonprofit will consume yL rather than z in period two. If
the potential utility loss is sufficiently large because U(z) is consider-
ably greater than U(yL), and/or if its occurrence is sufficiently
likely because the absolute value of 0 is large, the utility of current
(higher) consumption will outweigh the utility of consumption from
saving.
The analysis shows that the possibility of government interven-
tion complicates the saving decision. As can be seen from equation (4),
a nonprofit manager would not save if private donations are low
(C1¼ yL). Even if private income is high (C¼ yH), if the probability
of government help is positive and/or the marginal probability is
negative (> 0 and/or if 0< 0, as in equation (8)), the nonprofit may
not save.
4 Comparative statics
Assuming that some saving takes place, how do managers adjust
savings when the probability of bad times, the probability of govern-
ment intervention, and the minimum consumption level per client
change? We begin by considering comparative statics under the
assumption that 0 ¼ 0. We then consider how these results change if
0< 0.
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4.1 Comparative statics when 0 ¼ 0
Recalling that when @V/@s 0, s*¼ 0, the first order condition
for optimal saving, s* is 19
@V
@s
¼ U0 y1  s	ð Þ þ 1  pLð ÞU0 yH þ s	ð Þ
þ pL 1  ð ÞU0 yL þ s	ð Þ ¼ 0 ð9Þ
The resulting comparative statics are:
Effect of pL Effect of  Effect of z




The effect of increasing pL on s is unambiguously positive; thus an
increase in the likelihood of bad economic times induces saving. Simi-
larly, @V/@s is decreasing in , so an increase in the probability of
government intervention reduces saving. An increase in z does not
alter the amount of saving done by the nonprofit. We note that this
result depends on 0 being zero, which implies that the probability of
government intervention is constant. A change in s affects the non-
profit’s clients (and their utility) only if the government does not
intervene, so if s does not affect , it does not affect expected con-
sumption in period two.
We now consider the effects of pL,  and z on expected govern-
ment support, E(g), which give us some idea of the budgetary implica-
tions of the interaction between government and nonprofits. As noted
above, g¼ z s yL, so that the expected value of g is given by
EðgÞ ¼ pL z  s  yLð Þ ð10Þ
An increased probability of bad economic times, pL, has an ambiguous
effect on the expected amount of government support E(g) given to
the nonprofit. An increased likelihood of government support, ,
raises E(g). In both cases, the effects on E(g) of increased probability
of intervention have two components. When  increases, we observe a
direct effect due to the increased amount of expected government
19 As is the case of corner solutions, s* may not change for small changes
in parameters.
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payout. We also observe an indirect effect on E(g), which arises from
how saving changes in response to the changed probability.
To summarize the findings when 0 ¼ 0, an increase in pL, or the
probability of bad times, tends to increase saving and has an ambig-
uous effect on the expected government payout. An increase in the
likelihood of government help reduces saving and raises the expected
amount of government help. Finally, since z does not affect s, a change
in z has only a direct effect on E(g): The greater the amount guaran-
teed by the government, the greater its expected spending.
4.2 Comparative Statics when 0< 0
Effect of pL Effect of z
on savings, s non-negative non-positive
on expected government intervention, E(g) ambiguous non-negative
In this case the first order condition is
@V
@s
¼  U0 y1  sð Þ þ 1  pLð ÞU0 yH þ sð Þ þ pL 1  ð ÞU0 yL þ sð Þ
 pL0U yL þ sð Þ þ pL0UðzÞ ¼ 0 ð11Þ
Since  is endogenous, we cannot carry out a comparative statics
analysis with respect to . We use (11) to examine the effects of pL
and z on s and on E(g).
As in the case above, an increased probability of bad times
increases saving. It also has an ambiguous effect on expected govern-
ment expenditure. The rationale for this ambiguity (as above) arises
because when  rises, we observe a direct effect, increasing E(g), and
an indirect effect on E(g), which is altered when saving changes in
response to the changed probabilities.
In contrast to the case above, an increase in the minimum
consumption level per client, z, reduces saving. If saving affects the
probability of government help, an increase in z results in lower
marginal benefits of saving, which reduces the amount of saving
done by the nonprofit.
Also similar to the case above, an increase in z unambiguously
increases expected government support. In this case, the direct effect
of increased expected government payout and the indirect effect on
the amount of the expected payout, altered when s changes in
response to the changed probabilities, work in the same direction.
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To summarize both the cases of 0 ¼ 0 and 0< 0, we found that
an increased probability of bad times tends to induce saving, even if
the likelihood of government help is affected by that saving. Second,
potential government intervention to help a nonprofit in times of
duress tends to reduce the amount of saving done by the nonprofit.
This effect is strengthened if the government grantors view unspent
donations as indicative of a lack of need. (The minimum consumption
level per client has a negative effect on saving only when government
grantors are sensitive to saving decisions.) Both these effects there-
fore may cause nonprofits to spend readily on current consumption,
and increase the average burden on the public purse. Finally, whether
the amount of expected funding from government rises or falls cannot
be determined solely from a change in the probability of bad times.
This level does tend to rise when the probability of government help is
not affected by saving, but cannot be determined (the probability of
help is endogenous) when the probability of government help is
affected by saving levels. Finally, the expected amount of government
funding tends to change positively as government grantors increase
their minimum consumption level per client.
5 Empirical questions and suggestions for future research
The theoretical model illustrates the nonprofit manager’s trade-
off between using income to build up savings and serving more clients
immediately. Governments treat savings negatively as they signal
need. Anecdotal evidence suggests that nonprofits typically survive
on short-term budgets, with managers estimating income frequently
and expending as needed to meet the needs of as many clients as
possible. This scenario matches our model reasonably well: the non-
profit maximizes the utility of its clients (present and future), and
balances the needs of clients against having enough operating funds
to keep the operation afloat.
For policy purposes, the model suggests that the likelihood of
government help may induce ‘excessive’ current spending by non-
profits. This possibility may be viewed as a means of pressuring the
government in the future, ‘ratcheting up’ the amount of nonprofit
funding provided by government. We present here research issues and
questions that may be used in future research to test our findings
empirically.
First, we noted that an increased probability of bad times tends
to induce saving, even if the likelihood of government help is affected
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by that saving. Our model provides the counterintuitive result that
nonprofit saving and the economy run opposite to one another. To test
this idea, a researcher would examine multi-period data on nonprofit
expenditures, savings, capital accumulation, and economic character-
istics to discover how saving changes with economic conditions. We
note below, however, that adequate data do not exist in the USA or
Canada to help us test this or our other hypotheses, and that more
detailed data collection, such as audited statements will be necessary
to help pursue these issues.
We also found that increasing the probability that government
grantors will help a nonprofit in times of duress tends to reduce the
amount of saving, and that this effect is strengthened if government
grantors view unspent donations as indicative of a lack of need.
Specifically, our model reveals that the minimum consumption level
per client has a negative effect on saving only when government
grantors are sensitive to saving decisions. It would be interesting to
see how savings is affected by policy measures. If policy or legislation
suggests a minimum level of service in the current period that is
higher than what the nonprofit can provide in the next period, we
predict that savings will fall. We also predict that, under the same
circumstances, government grants to the nonprofit will rise. Finally,
researchers might explore whether a rise in nonprofit saving is fol-
lowed by a lowering of the amount of government grants.
We postulated, from anecdotal evidence, that nonprofits take a
myopic view of budgets. A basic question is then: What is the amount of
saving that nonprofit managers (executive directors and board mem-
bers) consider to be prudent in balancing client consumption and
operating reserves? Similarly, how do they view grantmakers’ actions
in granting funds in light of their saving? How do grantmakers them-
selves view savings? Do they have the same balance of operating
reserves and client service provision in mind when they determine
whether and how much to fund nonprofits? Most of these questions
could be answered only by surveying boards and executive directors,
and grantmakers both in nonprofit and government agencies.
In our model we also assumed one government grantor. Many
nonprofits, though, receive funding from many sources that likely
have different criteria and rationales for making grants. How do the
actions of various grantors affect saving behavior? Do grantors inter-
act with one another, affecting the total amount of grants received by
a nonprofit and the likelihood of additional funds in future periods?
And do grantors’ views on savings differ among nonprofit foundations
and agencies, government grantors at the national level, and those at
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regional and local levels? Again, surveys and case studies may provide
answers to these questions.
Perhaps quantitative analyses could be undertaken to shed light
on the saving decision. We began a preliminary search of financial
data that are or could be made available to assess the tradeoffs and
the amount and timing of resources used. Tax returns, currently the
only readily available source of data on registered nonprofits (and
generally the only publicly available data), give a year-end snapshot
of activities, reporting data at one point in time. These data do not
allow researchers to measure income or expenditures on a per client
basis, but do give aggregated figures. Using the accounting definition
of savings (receipts less disbursements) from these data may allow
analysis of a nonprofit’s savings, government funding, asset size, and
the relationships underlying its saving decisions. The data are unau-
dited, however, and a one-time view of the accounts of the agencies
may reveal little about spending and income patterns over the year.
Handy and Webb (2003) analyzed tax return data from Canada
to illuminate the decision to save versus serve more clients in social-
service providing charities.20 Transfer payment agencies in this
sample (those nonprofits providing social services in place of or for
government) reported lower (sometimes negative) saving than
non-transfer payment agencies, thus providing some evidence of an
expectation of government help. This leads to the research question,
does the percentage of government funding received drive the non-
profit manager’s saving behavior? On a larger scale, how are saving
decisions made in nonprofits not providing social services?
More than half the firms in Handy and Webb’s sample had
small, no, or negative savings.21 In this study savings were positively
correlated with size (assets) and negatively correlated with govern-
ment funding as a percentage of receipts. This may suggest that
smaller charities rely more on government funding in bad times, or
that as agencies grow, they have multiple resources from which to
spend on clients and to save to deal with future uncertainties.
Although the model presented here does not capture these issues,
researchers could continue to question whether smaller agencies are
more dependent on government and thus make different saving
decisions.
20 See their chapter for more discussion of the uses and problems of tax
return and other nonprofit data.
21 Negative saving may occur across several periods. See footnote 18.
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Finally, we restricted our model and assumed away changes in
underlying capital stock. In US and Canadian tax data the accounting
measure of savings used on tax returns, receipts less disbursements,
may not represent savings at all. Without more information, such as
that available on audited financial reports, we do not know how non-
profits allocate their funds between operational versus capital expenses.
We cannot tell if funds are set aside for long-run expenditures or
whether fixed assets are capitalized. If available, such data could show
whether excess disbursements came from a capital set up for the
purpose of raising capital funds to complete specific long-term projects.
As a starting point, this research provides a newer, more
comprehensive theory of the saving behavior of nonprofits. We have
proposed a theoretical model which should allow for the testing of many
different factors affecting saving and the expenditures made by govern-
ment to fund social service provision. We hope we have contributed to
better understanding of the role that saving plays in the nonprofit
arena, and that our efforts illustrate the consequences of the problem
of asymmetrical information between the funder and the nonprofit.
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Mode`le the´orique des effets du financement public sur les
de´cisions d’e´pargner des prestataires de services caritatifs et
sans but lucratif
Pourquoi les organisations prestataires de services sans but lucratif et
caritatives e´pargnent-elles? Quels sont les compromis entre utiliser les
be´ne´fices pour consolider les re´serves en liquidite´ et servir davantage de
clients? L’e´pargne peut ge´ne´rer des revenus, prote´ger l’organisation con-
tre une baisse des donations et accroıˆtre ses chances de survie. En
revanche l’e´pargne peut influencer ne´gativement la probabilite´ que les
organisations sans but lucratif rec¸oivent des fonds publics et prive´s. Les
auteurs mode`lisent la relation entre revenus publics et prive´s, conditions
e´conomiques et e´pargne des organisations sans but lucratif. Il ressort
qu’anticiper l’aide publique pendant des pe´riodes difficiles a tendance a`
re´duire le montant d’e´pargne de´gage´ par les organisations sans but
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lucratif. Cet effet est accru si les pouvoirs publics interpre`tent la non
de´pense des donations comme un indicateur du manque de besoins. Ces
deux effets incitent fortement les organisations sans but lucratif a` de´pen-
ser sous forme de consommation courante plutoˆt qu’a` e´pargner pour
l’avenir et donc a` alourdir la charge des pouvoirs publics.
Ein theoretisches Modell der Wirkungen o¨ffentlicher Finan-
zierung auf die Entscheidungen karitativer und Nonprofit-
Dienstleistungserbringer, Ru¨cklagen zu bilden
Warum bilden karitative und im Dienstleistungsbereich ta¨tige Non-
profit-Organisationen Ru¨cklagen? Welches sind die trade-offs
zwischen der Verwendung der Einku¨nfte zum Aufbau von Cash-Reser-
ven und der Ausweitung des Kundenstammes? Ru¨cklagenbildung
kann einku¨nfte erzeugen, die Organisation vor einem Ru¨ckgang der
Spenden schu¨tzen und die U¨berlebenschancen der Organisation erho¨-
hen. Ru¨cklagen mo¨gen jedoch die Wahrscheinlichkeit beeinflussen,
dass Nonprofit-Organisationen private und o¨ffentliche Finanzierungs-
mittel erhalten. Wir bilden ein Modell fu¨r die Beziehung zwischen
privaten und o¨ffentlichen Einku¨nften, o¨konomischen Bedingungen
sowie Ru¨cklagen von Nonprofit-Organisationen und stellen fest, dass
die Antizipation staatlicher Unterstu¨tzung in schwierigen Zeiten
tendenziell dazu fu¨hrt, die Ho¨he der Ru¨cklagen, die die Nonprofit-
Organisation bildet, zu verringern. Dieser Effekt wird versta¨rkt,
wenn die Vertreter des Staates nicht ausgegebene Spendenmittel als
Anzeichen mangelnden Bedarfs ansehen. Beide Effekte bilden fu¨r
Nonprofit-Organisationen einen starken Anreiz, eher Ausgaben fu¨r
laufenden Verbrauch zu ta¨tigen, als Ru¨cklagen fu¨r die Zukunft zu
bilden, und erho¨hen somit die Belastung der Staatskasse.
Modelo teo´rico de los efectos de la financiacio´n pu´blica sobre
las decisiones de ahorrar de las organizaciones que prestan
servicios caritativos y sin fines lucrativos
¿Por que´ ahorran las organizaciones que prestan servicios caritativos y
sin fines lucrativos? ¿Do´nde se encuentra el te´rmino medio entre uti-
lizar los beneficios para consolidar las reservas o disponer de liquidez
para servir mas clientes? El ahorro puede generar rentas, proteger a la
organizacio´n ante una caı´da de los donativos e incrementar sus posi-
bilidades de supervivencia. En contrapartida, el ahorro puede influir
negativamente en la probabilidad de que las organizaciones sin fines
lucrativos reciban fondos pu´blicos y privados. Los autores modelizan
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la relacio´n entre rentas pu´blicas y privadas, situacio´n econo´mica y
ahorro de las organizaciones sin fines lucrativos. Se pone de mani-
fiesto que anticipar la ayuda pu´blica durante los perı´odos dificiles
impulsa la tendencia a reducir el volumen de ahorro realizado por
las organizaciones sin fines lucrativos. El efecto se incrementa si los
poderes pu´blicos interpretan el hecho de no gastar los donativos como
una carencia de necesidades. Estos dos efectos incitan con fuerza a las
organizaciones sin fines lucrativos a gastar bajo la forma de consumo
corriente antes que a ahorrar para el futuro y agravar la carga de los
poderes pu´blicos.
282 F. HANDY and N.J. WEBB
#CIRIEC 2003

